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Abstract
In 1995, Robert E. Lucas, Jr., was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences.
This review places Lucas’ work in a historical context and evaluates the effect of
this work on the economics profession. Lucas’ central contribution is that he
developed and applied economic theory to answer substantive questions in
macroeconomics. Economists today routinely analyze systems in which agents
operate in complex probabilistic environments to understand interactions about
which the great theorists of an earlier generation could only speculate. This sea
change is due primarily to Lucas.
This essay is reprinted from the Journal of Economic Perspectives (Winter
1998, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 171–86) with the permission of the American Economic
Association.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Robert E. Lucas, Jr.,
wrote a number of papers which have rightly been revered
as modern classics. For this body of work, Lucas received
the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in the fall of 1995.
ThepurposeofthisreviewistoplaceLucas’workinahis-
toricalcontextandtoevaluatetheeffectofthisworkonthe
economics profession. In writing this review, I have ben-
eﬁted greatly from Lucas’ (1996) Nobel lecture and from
the essay of Thomas Sargent (1996) which was written to
kick off a conference held at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the pub-
licationofLucas’(1972)seminalpaper,“Expectationsand
the Neutrality of Money.”
Lucas’ work is sometimes heralded as revolutionary,
marking the beginning of the end of Keynesian economics
and the birth of rational expectations economics. This ten-
dency to mark all key developments in economics as rev-
olutionary is popular enough, but in my view, it is a mis-
reading of the history of economic thought. My thesis is
that Lucas’ work is very much a part of the natural prog-
ress of economics as a science. Scientiﬁc progress arises
from the interaction between theory and data and the de-
sire to have one uniﬁed theory to account for the observa-
tions at hand. The search for such a theory proceeds by
developing speciﬁc abstractions, or models, to understand
speciﬁc observations. These abstractions then lead to the
development of a more general theory, which in turn leads
to discarding models which are inconsistent with data and
to the development of better models. Lucas’ central con-
tributionwastodevelopandapplyeconomictheorytospe-
ciﬁc questions in macroeconomics and to make obsolete
one class of models. With trenchant vigor and uncommon
grace, Lucas argued that economic theory could be used to
illuminate old and puzzling substantive questions.
Lucas’ contributions are both methodological and sub-
stantive. The methodological contribution is to illustrate
how one goes about constructing dynamic, stochastic gen-
eral equilibrium models to shed light on questions of sub-
stantive economic interest. The substantive contribution is
to develop and analyze a speciﬁc mechanism by which
monetary instability leads to ﬂuctuations in output and in-
ﬂation. It is hard to overemphasize the contribution to
method. Economists today routinely analyze systems in
which agents operate in complex probabilistic environ-
ments in order to understand interactions about which the
great theorists of an earlier generation could only specu-
late. This sea change is due in substantial part to Lucas.
The Theoretical Foundations
of Macroeconomics
By the 1960s, the models used in macroeconomics de-
scribedtheaggregateeconomyasconsistingofasystemof
equations: one equation to describe consumption, one to
describe investment, one to describe money demand, and
so on. Each of these equations was loosely thought of as
arising from a deeper formulation of individual or ﬁrm de-
cision making. This approach was attractive because the
modelsweremathematicallyexplicitandtheparametersof
theequationscouldbeestimatedusingthepowerfulecono-
metric procedures that had been developed in the postwar
era under the inﬂuence of the Cowles Commission. These
macroeconometricmodelswerewidelyusedforanswering
questionssuchas,Howdoestheconductofmonetarypoli-
cy affect output, inﬂation, and unemployment? A growing
consensus in economics viewed these models as ﬁtting the
behavior of the U.S. economy and as suitable for generat-
ing answers to policy questions; for an expression of this
conﬁdence, see Franco Modigliani’s (1977) presidential
address to the American Economic Association. At the
same time, the desirability of making speciﬁc the relation-
ship between macroeconometric models and microeco-
nomic theory was widely recognized. That is, macroeco-
nomics needed theoretical foundations.
Thechiefdifficultyindevelopingthesefoundationswas
that macroeconomic questions necessarily involve dealing
with dynamics and uncertainty. An individual choosing
how much to spend today is necessarily making a choice
of how much to consume in the future. Investment deci-
sionsarebasedonthe expectationsoffuturereturns. These
andotherdecisionsarefraughtwithrisk.Furthermore,they
are based on anticipations of prices that will prevail in the
future. How does one model this decision making and the
way in which anticipations are made and revised?
Economic theory is about developing frameworks that
can be used to analyze such situations. The theory has at
its base two fundamental postulates. First, individuals act
purposefully to achieve the ends they seek, and this fea-
ture can best be captured in models where agents maxi-
mize a well-deﬁned objective function. Second, since out-
comes depend upon the actions of everyone in society,
agents must form expectations about the actions of others
and, indeed, expectations about the expectations of others,
and so on. This feature can be captured by the notion of
equilibrium.
The equilibrium postulate is a convenient and powerful
way of summarizing these expectations and ensuring con-
sistency in decision making. As the name suggests, equi-
librium is the rest point of a system, and it was conven-
tional to think of this rest point in terms of quantities and
prices. However, this conventional view is not particularly
helpful in thinking about a world which is continually buf-
feted by shocks. In such a world, the sensible way to
think about decision problems is as formulating decision
rules or contingency plans for choosing actions which
depend upon agents’ information. The central theoretical
breakthrough of the last 50 years is that economists now
think of equilibrium as a rest point in the space of deci-
sion rules. This breakthrough appeared in the most the-
oretical and abstract reaches of the discipline in the work
of John Nash (1950) in game theory and the work of Ken-
nethArrow(1951)andGerardDebreu(1959)inthetheory
of competitive equilibrium. Lucas is perhaps the foremost
recent developer and expositor of this view. Thinking of
equilibrium as a rest point in the space of decision rules
hasgiveneconomiststheconceptualframeworktoanalyze
a bewildering variety of environments in which dynamics
and uncertainty play central roles.
The contrast between the theoretical foundations of the
1960s-style macroeconometric models and those of mod-
ern models is stark; the book edited by Thomas Cooley
(1995) is a collection of papers which illustrate the style of
modern macroeconomic modeling. The earlier generation
of macroeconometric models was frequently rationalized
as representing the equilibria of static general equilibrium
models together with tacked on dynamics representing
slowwageand priceadjustmenttoshocks.Theparameters
describing the speed of adjustment were not derived frommaximizingbehavior.Thenotionthatpeoplesettingwages
and prices will not react rationally to the expected future
state of the economy, or will react in a mechanistic way, is
fundamentally at odds with the maximization postulate. It
was well understood that this was not a happy state of af-
fairs. Resistance to conventional economic theory came in
substantial part because equilibrium models were thought
to be inconsistent with high rates of unemployment.
Thus, the macroeconomics of the 1960s and early
1970s needed ﬁrm theoretical foundations, and the great
contribution of Lucas and others (including Robert Barro,
Edward Prescott, Sargent, and Neil Wallace) lies in the at-
tempt to reformulate old questions in the language of eco-
nomic theory. In doing so, these theorists clariﬁed the
questions for which macroeconometric models could pro-
vide reliable answers and the questions for which such
models could not provide reliable answers. More impor-
tant, these theorists laid out a research program for study-
ingsubstantivequestionsinmacroeconomics.Moderneco-
nomic models apply economic theory consistently. These
models also have a surprising ability to reproduce obser-
vations that were thought to be inconsistent with equilibri-
um, including unemployment, underutilization of capital,
and ﬂuctuations in economic aggregates.
In the next sections of this review, I focus on two pa-
pers by Lucas: his 1972 paper “Expectations and the Neu-
trality of Money” and his 1976 paper “Econometric Policy
Evaluation:ACritique.”Thesepaperswereexplicitlycited
by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences in awarding
Lucas the Nobel prize.
Expectations and the Neutrality of Money
The Setting
By the late 1960s, there was a consensus among macro-
economists that the Phillips curve was a central feature of
business cycles. A. W. Phillips (1958) plotted the rate of
growth of nominal wages against the unemployment rate
for the United Kingdom and showed that these variables
were negatively associated. Subsequent analyses focused
on the relationship between the rate of change of a broad
index of prices of goods and services—that is, the inﬂa-
tion rate—and the deviations of gross national product, or
output, from a trend. A stable relationship of this kind has
immediate policy implications. It suggests that monetary
authorities can lower unemployment at the cost of a some-
what higher inﬂation rate and can reduce the inﬂation rate
only by incurring the cost of higher unemployment.
However, Milton Friedman (1968) and Edmund Phelps
(1968) soon mounted powerful theoretical arguments
against these policy recommendations. They argued that
economic theory suggests that sustained inﬂation can have
no effect because people care about real quantities, not
nominal ones. Once people anticipate sustained inﬂation,
they will adjust their pricing, employment, and job search
decisionsinwaysthattakeinﬂationintoaccount,rendering
the inﬂation irrelevant to real economic decisions. These
considerations suggest that sustained inﬂation cannot lead
to a permanent reduction in unemployment. Friedman em-
phasized that expectations adjust slowly to permanent
changes in the inﬂation rate. This slow adjustment implies
thatunemploymentcanbetemporarilylowwhentheecon-
omy is stimulated by, say, expansionary monetary policy.
But eventually the monetary expansion will ﬁlter through
to the economy in higher prices, and unemployment will
return to the level determined by underlying real forces.
Phelps (1970), in his introductory essay to a marvelous
volume,sketchedoutaformulationinwhichinformational
imperfections lead people to believe that overall price
changes reﬂecting monetary ﬂuctuations are instead rel-
ativepricechangesfavoringtheindustryorsectorinwhich
theyareemployed.ThestagewassetforLucastoﬂesh out
this sketch in the language of modern economic theory.
The Question
In “Expectations and the Neutrality of Money,” Lucas
(1972) asks one of the oldest questions in economics:
How do changes in the conduct of monetary policy affect
inﬂation, output, and unemployment? At least since David
Hume in 1752 (in Rotwein 1970), economists have strug-
gled with this question, and it continues to occupy center
stage two and a half centuries later. The evidence is un-
ambiguous in one respect: Business cycle booms are times
in which the growth rate of monetary aggregates is higher
than average, and contractions are times in which the
growth rate of monetary aggregates is lower than average.
A central question in macroeconomics is whether mone-
tary policy can and should be used to moderate business
cycle ﬂuctuations. It is the kind of question that the data
alone cannot answer. Models are needed.
Lucas made a substantive and a methodological con-
tribution in his 1972 paper. The substantive contribution is
to develop and analyze a speciﬁc mechanism by which
monetary instability leads to ﬂuctuations in output and in-
ﬂation.Inthismechanism,peoplewithlimitedinformation
confuse monetary disturbances with relative price move-
ments, so that monetary ﬂuctuations lead to aggregate out-
put ﬂuctuations. The methodological contribution is to
illustrate how one goes about constructing dynamic, sto-
chastic general equilibrium models to shed light on ques-
tions of substantive economic interest.
Lucas set his argument in a framework originally in-
troduced by Paul Samuelson (1958). In this overlapping
generationsframework,peoplelivefortwoperiods,sothat
in any period the economy always has people of two age
groups, the young and the old. At the end of each period,
the old die, the young become old, and a new generation
is born. There is only one good. Only the young can work
and produce the good, but both young and old people like
to consume it. The good cannot be stored. In this highly
stylized economy, current and future generations can all be
made better off if they could devise some mechanism to
transferpart of production inevery period tothose who are
old. One obvious such institution is social security, and
indeed, modern analyses of social security programs use
the overlapping generations model as a point of departure.
Samuelson (1958) noted that other institutions could al-
so perform much the same function. In particular, intrinsi-
cally useless pieces of paper, called money, could provide
the old with a claim to part of the output produced by the
young.Eachgenerationofyoungpeoplewillinglygivesup
part of what they produce for pieces of paper, because they
think that future generations will exchange these pieces of
paper for goods. Suppose that the number of pieces of
paper, or the stock of money, is ﬁxed and held by the initial
generation of oldpeople and that each generationof young
people is identical. The simplest way of thinking about
this kind of economy is that people behave competitively;that is, they take the price of goods in terms of money as
unaffected by their individual decisions on how much to
produce and consume. Old people supply all the money
they possess and consume what the market provides.
Young people have a more interesting problem. In choos-
ing how much of their production to supply to the market,
they need to forecast the value of money when they are
old. The value of money, of course, depends upon the de-
cisions of the next generation and therefore upon the fore-
casts that will be made by the next generation. Rational
decision making by today’s young requires forecasting the
forecasts of others.
It is here that the notion of equilibrium allows analysis
of an apparently intractable problem. In this unchanging
world, the notion of equilibrium requires that expectations
of future prices, or forecasts, be the same as the prices that
actually prevail. An equilibrium, then, is a price in each
period and a choice by young people in each period of
how much to sell to the market, given the price when they
are young and the price when they are old, such that the
amount of money brought by old people into the market
is the same as the amount of money young people want
to carry into the future. This last requirement is sometimes
described as a market-clearing condition.
This kind of monetary economy shares a feature with
all sensibly formulated economies. The units in which
prices are quoted have no effect on the outcomes people
care about.Ifwesplitupdollarbills intopenniesandquote
prices in pennies rather than dollars, it is obvious that all
thathappensisthatpricesare multipliedbyafactorof 100.
This property is called zero-degree homogeneity of prices.
An implication of zero-degree homogeneity is that if we
double the number of dollar bills once and for all in the
hands of the initial generation of old people, all that hap-
pens is that prices double in all periods. Monetary econo-
mies with this feature are said to display neutrality. More
generally, money is said to be neutral if a proportionate
change in all nominal, or dollar-denominated, quantities in
all periods is associated with a proportionate change in all
prices and no change in real quantities. In Samuelson’s
(1958) economy, a one-time change in the number of dol-
lars held by the initial generation of old people leads to a
proportionate change in all nominal quantities and in all
prices, so that monetary injections of this kind are neutral.
Monetary injections of other kinds may or may not be
neutral. Suppose, for example, that a monetary authority
expands the quantity of money at a constant rate and does
so by continually handing out money to old people in a
lump-sum fashion, that is, independently of the amount of
money anyparticular old personmay have. Onewould ex-
pect this kind of injection to lead to a constant increase in
the price of goods, that is, to inﬂation. In this kind of a
world, young people see that the purchasing power of
money will be diminished by the time they are old, and
this reduced reward to work today leads to a fall in their
willingness to work and in output. That is, inﬂation in-
duced by ongoing monetary expansions of this kind acts
much as a tax does. The inﬂation tax is an important fea-
ture of actual economies, but in this context, it leads to the
implication that anticipated expansions in the stock of
money depress current economic activity. Lucas, remem-
ber, is seeking to create a framework in which a current
expansion in the stock of money ﬁrstcreates a surge inreal
activity, as the evidence suggests actually occurs, but is
neutral in the long run. For this purpose, the inﬂation tax
argument works in exactly the wrong way.
However, there are other ways of injecting money into
the economy which lead to continuing inﬂation but do not
alter real decisions about how much to produce and con-
sume. Consider, for example, handing out money to old
people in exact proportion to the amount of money they
have carried over from the past. Monetary injections of
this kind are neutral because they do not change the rate
of return to holding money. With injections of this kind,
the negative effect of inﬂation on willingness to work is
exactly undone by the higher return associated with the
proportionate transfer.
The Answer
To make the informational mechanism play a central role,
Lucas assumes that transfers are proportional. Consider a
situation in which these transfers are random. The interest-
ing feature of this economy is that even if the young do
not know the size of the monetary transfer in the current
period, money is still neutral. The reason is that in com-
petitive markets, the young generation can observe the
price of goods before making their production decision.
Therefore, in equilibrium, the prices reveal the size of the
monetary transfer. As a result, in equilibrium, prices sim-
ply rise in each period by the amount of the transfer, and
real allocations are completely unaffected.
The central economic idea that Lucas wants to formal-
ize is that monetary disturbances lead to movements in
prices that people interpret as meaning that the present is
afavorabletimetoproduce.TheelegantformulationLucas
chooses is one in which trade occurs in “two physically
separated markets” (1972, p. 103). Speciﬁcally, think of
the economy as two islands, each with an equal number of
old people. The overall number of young people is ﬁxed,
but they are divided randomly between the two islands in
agiventimeperiod.Supposeforthe momentthatthestock
of money is ﬁxed for all time. Young people who ﬁnd
themselves on an island with few young people will ﬁnd
that the price of the good they sell is high, since there are
few producers. This temporarily high price signals to them
that they should produce a relatively large amount. Young
people assigned to the other island ﬁnd a low price and
choose to produce little. In this economy, output on one
island is higher than average, and output on the other is-
land is lower than average. There is no particular reason
that total output should exactly be equal to its average
value, so in this sense output will ﬂuctuate over time, de-
pendingontheexactassignmentofyoungpeople.Howev-
er,these ﬂuctuationsseemto havelittletodo withbusiness
cycles, since a key feature of the business cycle is that es-
sentially all sectors of the economy move together.
Now consider adding monetary disturbances to this
economy. A higher than average transfer induces prices to
rise on both islands. Consider the problem facing a typical
young person. Prices could be high because of the mone-
tary disturbance, in which case the best thing to do is not
torespondintermsofproductiondecisions,orpricescould
be high because there are relatively few people on the is-
land, in which case the best thing to do is to produce more.
If a producer does not know why the price is high, the op-
timal decision is a mix of these extremes, so that output in
both islands rises relative to the case when there was nomonetary disturbance. Thus, in this economy, prices are
higher than average precisely when output is higher than
average—and this is precisely when the rate of growth of
themoneysupplyishigherthanaverage.Pricesand output
are lower than average when the rate of growth of money
is lower than average. Notice, however, that if the size of
the monetary disturbance is known, there is no scope for
confusion about the source of the price increase, and
monetarydisturbances areneutral.Themodel requiresthat
we draw a sharp distinction between anticipated monetary
ﬂuctuations, which are neutral, and unanticipated ﬂuctua-
tions, which induce output movements.
Lucas (1972, p. 119) also uses the model to argue for
a particular sense in which the best monetary policy is one
in which the monetary authority follows a “k-percent
rule,” in which the rate of growth of the quantity of mon-
ey is constant. At this point it is best to quote from the
conclusion to the paper (Lucas 1972, pp. 121–22):
This paper has been an attempt to resolve the paradox posed
by Gurley (1961), in his mild but accurate parody of Fried-
manian monetary theory: “Money is a veil, but when the veil
ﬂutters, real output sputters.” This resolution has been ef-
fected by postulating economic agents free of money illu-
sion, so that the Ricardian hypothetical experiment of a fully
announced, proportional monetary expansion will have no
real consequences (that is, so that money is a veil). These
rational agents are then placed in a setting in which the in-
formation conveyed to traders by market pricesis inadequate
to permit them to distinguish real from monetary distur-
bances. In this setting, monetary ﬂuctuations lead to real
output movements in the same direction.
In order for this resolution to carry any conviction, it
has been necessary to adopt a framework simple enough to
permit a precise speciﬁcation of the information available to
each trader at each point in time, and to facilitate veriﬁcation
of the rationality of each trader’s behavior. To obtain this
simplicity, most of the interesting features of the observed
business cycle have been abstracted from, with one notable
exception: the Phillips curve emerges not as an unexplained




economic model with rational agents is at one level an
impressive display of technical wizardry. The key to the
technical contribution is that prices are thought of as func-
tions of the state of the economy, where the state is the
stockofmoneyandthedistributionofyoungpeopleacross
islands. This notion has its antecedents in the work of
Arrow (1951), Debreu (1959), John Muth (1961), and
Lucas and Prescott(1971). Muth advanced the principleof
rational expectations as a model-building device: the idea
is that the expectations attributed to economic agents in a
model should be the same as those implied by the model.
More generally, the rational expectations hypothesis is that
agents use available information in the best way.
It took some time before this principle was widely used
in economics. Once it began to be used, however, it took
the ﬁeld by storm for three reasons. First, unlike the al-
ternatives, the notion of rational expectations adds no free
parameters but, instead, imposes restrictions across equa-
tions. In contrast, for example, the notion of adaptive ex-
pectations involves adding free parameters to describe
how expectations are formed and revised. Second, rational
expectations is consistent with individual maximization,
since it rules out the existence of obvious proﬁt opportuni-
ties. Third, the equilibrium point of view practically forces
one to use rational expectations. Once prices and choices
are thought of as functions of the state of the economy,
one is forced to impart beliefs to economic agents about
how the state evolves and therefore beliefs about the mod-
el of the economy held by agents in our models. Today,
it seems hard to imagine starting anywhere else.
Some of the most interesting recent theoretical work
involves studying how agents learn; a good introduction
to this literature is Sargent 1993. Speciﬁcally, one ques-
tion that many authors have attempted to study is whether
agents who start off with beliefs other than those implied
by rational expectations will eventually come to hold ra-
tional expectations. Another line of research assumes that
peopleareboundedlyrationalandaskswhethersuchecon-
omies will eventually look like economies with fully ra-
tional agents. The starting point for both literatures is a ra-
tional expectations equilibrium.
With the model in “Expectations and the Neutrality of
Money,” Lucas emphasizes the distinction between antici-
pated and unanticipated changes in the stock of money. In
this sense, the approach represents a difference, and I think
an advance, over the distinction between the long run and
the short run which both Friedman and the Keynesian lit-
erature emphasized. The speciﬁc formulation led to a long
and misdirected debate over whether rational expectations
impliesthatanticipatedmonetarypolicycouldhavenoreal
effects.Itisabundantlyclearfromthemodelthatneutrality
of anticipated monetary policy depends critically upon the
manner in which money is injected. Other ways of inject-
ing money have effects on output. For example, if mone-
taryinjectionsweremadeinalump-summanner,theinﬂa-
tion tax would affect the behavior of output. However, we
have good reason to believe that these effects are likely to
be small. In any event, the economy will respond quite dif-
ferently to anticipated and unanticipated changes in the
stock of money.
Thiscontributionof“ExpectationsandtheNeutralityof
Money” led to an extensive empirical literature. (See, for
example, Sargent 1976 and Barro 1977.) In “Some Inter-
national Evidence on Output-Inﬂation Tradeoffs,” Lucas
(1973) noted that a key implication of the 1972 paper is
that when monetary ﬂuctuations become very volatile,
agents will pay no attention to the price signal when mak-
ing their decisions. This immediately suggests that coun-
tries with volatile inﬂation rates should have less volatile
output.Theinternationalevidencelentsomesupporttothis
view. The distinction between the effect on output of an-
ticipated and unanticipated changes in the stock of money
was also tested for U.S. time series data by many econo-
mists, notably Sargent and Barro. The evidence here is
mixed, and it is fair to say that the effects of price surprises
appear to be weak.
The idea that informational limitations play a central
role in how monetary policy affects output in the real
world has largely fallen by the wayside. In part, this is be-
cause of the evidence from U.S. time series. The main
reason, however, is that it seems quite difficult to use this
mechanism to generate persistent effects of monetary
shocks on output. In developed economies like the United
States,informationabouteconomywideoutcomesisreadi-ly and quickly available. It may be reasonable to suppose
thatpeopleareconfusedaboutthesourcesofpricechanges
for perhaps two or three months, but it seems difficult to
see how people could continue to be misinformed for two
orthreeyears.Sincebusinesscycleﬂuctuationslastatleast
that long, this mechanism is not persuasive as a model of
business cycles.
One especially interesting logical descendant of “Ex-
pectations and the Neutrality of Money” is Finn Kydland
and Prescott’s (1982) “Time to Build and Aggregate Fluc-
tuations.” Both papers take seriously the ideas of focusing
on one key driving force behind business cycle ﬂuctua-
tions, of using the best economic theory available, and of
taking the implications of the theory seriously. Substan-
tively, however, it is difficult to imagine two papers more
at odds with each other. In 1972, Lucas modeled business
cycles as an avoidable consequence of erratic monetary
policy. In 1982, Kydland and Prescott modeled business
cycles as the efficient response of the economy to technol-
ogy disturbances. Neither paper’s substantive message has
been accepted by the profession at large, but the method-
ological contributions are overwhelming. It is hard to pick
uparecentlypublishedpaperinmacroeconomicsthatdoes
not routinely use the notion of rational expectations equi-
librium,anddynamic, stochasticgeneralequilibriummod-
els in the style of these papers have become the work-
horses of modern macroeconomics.
What, then, is the legacy of “Expectations and the Neu-
trality of Money”? The paper is a contribution to method.
It led to a simple reduced-form model of output ﬂuctua-
tionswhichcontinuestobewidelyusedinthetime-consis-
tency literature and in positive models of central bank pol-
icy. Along with the work of Friedman and Phelps, the
paper contributed to the demise of the belief that there was
a long-run trade-off between unemployment and inﬂation
for policymakers to exploit. The great inﬂation of the
1970s was surely due in part to the economics profession’s
acceptance of the Phillips curve, just as the great disinﬂa-
tion of the 1980s and 1990s was due in part to the profes-
sion’sacceptancethatthelong-runPhillipscurveisvertical
(or perhaps even slopes upward). In this, as in so much
else, ideas have profound consequences.
Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique
The process of integrating economic theory into macro-
economics has fundamentally altered the profession’s per-
spective on a variety of questions. Most notably, it has dis-
credited the usefulness of 1960s-style macroeconometric
modelsforansweringavarietyofpolicyquestions.Forex-
ample, suppose we want to ask how the behavior of the
U.S. economy would change if the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem were to adopt a policy of maintaining the growth rate
of the money supply at 4 percent per annum. Using pa-
rameter estimates in a macroeconometric model generated
fromatimeperiodwhentheFederalReservewaspursuing
a completely different policy makes sense if one believes
theseparameterswouldnotchangeunderadifferentpolicy
regime. The problem is that economists have every reason
to believe that parameters in such models are a mongrel of
the way in which people’s expectations are formed and of
underlying features of the economy, such as preferences
and technology. Expectations depend upon the nature of
the policy regime in place and therefore are likely to
change systematically with the regime. This is the sub-
stance of the 1976 Lucas critique.
In some ways, the Lucas critique has had a more sub-
stantialimpactthandid“ExpectationsandtheNeutralityof
Money” (1972). In part, this is due to the simplicity of the
examples Lucas used in the critique to make his point. But
the greater impact of the critique stems from the fact that
it uses entirely conventional theoretical formulations to
criticize the use of macroeconometric models in policy
evaluation.Economistshavelongunderstoodthateconom-
icmodelscannotsensiblybeusedforpolicyevaluationun-
less one has conﬁdence that the structure of the model and
its parameters are likely not to change under alternative
policies. The typical macroeconometric model is a system
of equations which are interpreted as describing the be-
havior of the people, the ﬁrms, and the government in the
economy. When such models are used for evaluating al-
ternative policies, they implicitly presume that the param-
eters of the equations will be invariant with respect to al-
ternative policies. However, as Lucas (1976, p. 25) wrote
in a later paper: “Everything we know about dynamic eco-
nomic theory indicates that this presumption is unjusti-
ﬁed” (emphasis in original). The argument behind this
boldclaimisthat theequationsinmacroeconometricmod-
els are implicitly based on decision rules which specify
what people will do, given the state of the economy. How-
ever, these decision rules depend on their expectations of
future policies, which in turn surely depend on the kinds of
policieschoseninthepast.Ifpolicymakerschoosepolicies
in a new manner, surely people’s expectations about future
policies will change, and their decision rules will also.
The distinction between structuraland reduced-form pa-
rameters and warnings about using reduced-form models
for policymaking were well known in economics far be-
fore Lucas. (See, for example, the work of Jan Tinbergen,
1952, and Jacob Marschak, 1953.) The value of the cri-
tique lies in its use of graphic examples to illustrate the
argument and the alternative program it advocated. The
ﬁrst example Lucas uses is one based on Friedman’s per-
manentincomehypothesis.Friedman(1957)hypothesized
that consumption is a function of permanent income,
which is deﬁned as that constant ﬂow which yields the
same present value as an individual’s expected present
value of actual income. Friedman also posited that per-
manent income is a weighted average of past incomes.
Muth (1960) then showed more rigorously that a particu-
lar stochastic behavior of income over time, together with
optimal forecasting by agents, implies that the best esti-
mate of permanent income is an exponentially weighted
average of past incomes. This stochastic process for in-
come is given by the sum of a highly persistent part (a
random walk) and a very transitory part (an independent
random variable). Muth showed that the weights on past
incomes depend on the relative variabilities of the two
components; for example, if the transitory part has large
variance, rational individuals attribute income ﬂuctuations
to the transitory part, and thus, the weight on current in-
come is low. In terms of the relationship between con-
sumption and income, this theory gives consumption as a
function of current and past incomes, where the weights
depend upon the relative variabilities. From an economet-
ric point of view, one can obtain the relationship betweenconsumption and income from historical data by running
a regression.
Lucas used this framework to make his point that this
kind of regression relation cannot be used to uncover pa-
rameter values which are invariant across some interesting
policy experiments. Consider a policy which supplements
the individual’s income by a constant amount forever. If
this policy is known to the individual, it is clear that per-
manent income rises by the amount of the supplement and
consumption rises in proportion to permanent income.
Traditional uses of macroeconometric models regard the
relationship between consumption and income as given by
the historical data and use the estimated relationship to
forecast the implied time path of the expected change in
consumption. This relationship implies that expected con-
sumption will gradually rise. The theory, however, says
that consumption should rise immediately and that expect-
ed consumption should be permanently higher immedi-
ately. This apparent conﬂict between the implications of
a widely accepted theory and conventional procedure has
had a lasting effect on the profession.
Lucas used other examples to make the point that con-
ﬂicts of this variety are pervasive. One example concerns
the effect of a temporary investment tax credit to stimulate
economic activity in recessions. It makes the point that
anticipations of an investment tax credit, while the pro-
posed credit is moving through the political process, may
induce ﬁrms to postpone investments and, thereby, may
accentuate the very recession the policy is designed to
eliminate.
The real value of the critique lies in the clearly articu-
lated research program it envisions. This research program
involves specifyinga structuralmodel as well asthe policy
regime under which the economy is thought to operate. A
policy regime is simply a function which prescribes the
policies for each state of the economy. Economic agents in
the model are thought of as knowing the policy regime.
Data can then be used to uncover the regime as well as the
details of the model. Policy evaluation, then, consists of
evaluating the properties of the model under alternative
policy regimes. This contribution has led directly to a vast
literature on rational expectations econometrics (for exam-
ple, Lucas and Sargent 1981).
The research program has also had a profound impact
on the old argument over rules versus discretion in eco-
nomic policymaking. Friedman (1968) has been perhaps
the most prominent proponent of the view that economic
and especially monetary policy should be constrained by
rules that specify policy as an explicit function of the state
of the economy. His arguments are primarily based on the
practical view that discretionary policymaking has led to
bad outcomes and that economists and policymakers do
not know enough about the structure of the economy for
discretionary policy to work well. Lucas’ argument is
based on the view that economists simply have no hope
of understanding the effect of policies unless we think of
policies as choosing among alternative rules.
Consider, for example, the question, Should the Federal
Reserve raise interest rates next quarter? Answering this
question requires that we know how future expectations
will change in response to this action. If the current policy
regime prescribes that the Federal Reserve should raise
interest rates, then it is clear that we can forecast the ef-
fects of this action. If it does not, then we need to know
how private agents will react to an apparent change in the
regime. The problem is that we have no way of knowing
what the new regime is. Private agents may even view
this action as simply erratic monetary policy, and it is not
clear that policy exercises which involve introducing noise
are desirable.
Economists can, however, offer sensible policy advice
when it comes to choosing among alternative policy rules,
which are ways in which actions should be chosen de-
pending upon the state of the economy. From this per-
spective, the question economists can answer should be
posed as, Is raising interest rates next quarter part of a rule
for the conduct of monetary policy that will lead to good
outcomes on average? It should be emphasized that the
point that economists can offer sensible advice only when
it comes to choosing among alternative rules in no way
implies that proposals such as Friedman’s, that the stock
of money should grow at 4 percent a year, are necessarily
optimal. For example, John Taylor (1979) developed a
model with staggered wage-setting in which a monetary
policy rule which reacts to the state of the economy is
better than a ﬁxed money growth rate rule.
The perspective that policies should be thought of as
rules has also led to an inﬂuential research program which
uses game-theoretic techniques to understand the relative
advantages of rules and discretion in policymaking. Be-
ginning with the seminal contributions of Kydland and
Prescott (1977) and GuillermoCalvo (1978), this literature
thinks of discretionary policy as a situation in which the
actions in each period are required to be optimal for the
policymaker relative to other possible actions. This crite-
rion generates policies as rules. It turns out, however, that
the rules for policymaking implied by this procedure can
be dominated in an average sense by other policies. Put
differently, the policymaker can be made better off by
committing to follow future policies. The simplest exam-
ple is the payment of ransom to hostages. If a government
could credibly commit never to pay ransom, it is possible
that kidnappers would choose never to take prisoners hos-
tage. The problem, of course, is that once hostages are
taken, it may well be optimal to pay the ransom to save
the hostages’ lives. This issue shows up in economic sit-
uations as well. Consider, for example, the problem of de-
fault on government debt. Since revenues to pay interest
on such debt typically must be raised from taxes that
distort private decisions, it is optimal to default on govern-
ment debt and promise never to do so again. Obviously,
nobody would buy such debt if the promises were not
believed. This example, then, illustrates the importance of
being able to commit to an action (not to default on the
debt) even though one would like to deviate from the
committed action later. The models used in the rules ver-
sus discretion literature do not provide simple answers.
However, taking economic theory seriously, as Lucas did,
has led to an enormously inﬂuential and rich research
agenda.
Other Contributions
Lucas has made signiﬁcant contributions to a number of
ﬁelds in economics including ﬁnancial economics (1978),
monetary theory (1980a, Lucas and Stokey 1987), public
ﬁnance (Lucas and Stokey 1983), international economics
(1982), and, most recently, economic growth (1988). Inevery area, his work has set new standards and generated
a large new literature. Here, let me discuss only a few of
my favorites.
The work of Lucas and Leonard Rapping (1969) is,
quite simply, a classic. Lucas and Rapping tried to under-
stand why employment fell so dramatically during the
Great Depression and rose so dramatically during World
War II. Central to their argument is the idea that house-
holds work more hours when wages are temporarily high
and fewer hours when wages are temporarily low. In the
jargon of economics, the intertemporal elasticity of labor
supply is high. Labor economists and macroeconomists to
this day continue to argue over the size of this elasticity.
It plays a central role in any model which attempts to
understand the ﬂuctuations of employment over the busi-
ness cycle. Lucas and Rapping used a form of adaptive
expectations in their model, but emphasis on intertemporal
labor supply substitution continues in Lucas’ own work
and in much other work on business cycles.
Lucas 1978 is one of the most inﬂuential papers in ﬁ-
nancial economics. Here Lucas showed how asset prices
could be expressed as a function of the economy’s state
variables and that this function is the solution to a func-
tional equation that arises from individual optimization
and market-clearing. This elegant characterization is now
routinely used in the asset-pricing literature.
The ﬁeld of economic growth has been a growth in-
dustry in the last decade. In the so-called new growth lit-
erature, the long-run growth rate is determined by the
accumulation of physical capital, human capital, and tech-
nological know-how. In this area, Lucas (1988) has made
powerful arguments that human capital accumulation has
important external effects and that learning by doing plays
an important role in the process of human capital accumu-
lation.
In many ways, my personal favorite of Lucas’ work is
“Methods and Problems in Business Cycle Theory”
(1980b), which is a piece on methodology in economics.
In general, I am hostile to methodological pieces; I prefer
to read about work that has been done rather than be
preachedatabouthowtodoit.However,thebasicpremise
of this engaging article is that, as scientists, economists are
limited by the tools at their disposal rather than by their
ability to make verbal conjectures about how the world
works. Lucas argued that improvements in economic
theoryandcomputationalabilitieshavebeendrivingforces
inthepostwartransformationofeconomicsintoaquantita-
tive science. Lucas (1980b, pp. 709–10) wrote that “Our
task as I see it...i st owrite a FORTRAN program that
will accept speciﬁc economic policy rules as ‘input’ and
will generate as ‘output’ statistics describing the operating
characteristics of time series we care about, which are pre-
dicted to result from these policies.” And how are we to
build this FORTRAN program? “Progress in economic
thinking means getting better and better abstract, analogue
economic models, not better verbal observations about the
world” (Lucas 1980b, p. 700).
A Summing Up
Robert E. Lucas, Jr., is the preeminent macroeconomist of
the last 25 years. Even when academic macroeconomists
disagree over substantive questions, most work today un-
der a common set of standards that deﬁne high-quality
work. We use similar equilibrium concepts, econometric
techniques, and models of policymaking. This agreement
overmethodisduein substantialparttoLucas.Thelogical
structure of his arguments has been central in this meth-
odological victory, although the ﬂair and grace of his writ-
ing and his ability to craft persuasive examples to make
telling points have played important supporting roles.
Sargent (1996, p. 536) has written that “the late 1960s
were good times to be a young macroeconomist.” Ideas
and controversies were in the air. There was a general
feeling that economic science was on the verge of making
sharp quantitative statements about a host of issues. The
late 1990s seem to me to be even better times. The con-
troversies are just as pronounced, but the sophistication of
our theoretical tools and our abilities to make quantitative
assessments are now vastly greater. Progress has by some
measure been slow over the last three decades, but it is
sobering to think how much slower it would have been
without Lucas’ contributions.
*This essay is reprinted, with permission, from the Journal of Economic Per-
spectives (Winter 1998, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 171–86). © 1998 by the American Eco-
nomicAssociation.Allrightsreserved.Theessaywaseditedforpublicationinthe Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review.
†Author’s note: I ﬁrst got to know Bob Lucas when I, as a graduate student at
Carnegie-Mellon, was fortunate enough to spend a year at Chicago. I still have not
gotten over being treated as an equal. I am pleased to have this opportunity to ac-
knowledge my intellectual debt. Bob is a charming and delightful person, but you do
want to be thoroughly armed in any debate with him. His rhetorical skills are formi-
dable beyond belief, and since he reads widely and majored in history, it is tough to
win a debate with him. I haven’t, as yet, but I keep trying. A marvelous autobiography
is available through the home page of the Nobel Foundation (http://www.nobel.se). I
highly recommend it.
CommentsfromBradDeLong,NarayanaKocherlakota,AlanKrueger,andTimo-
thy Taylor were enormously helpful in writing this essay. The views expressed here are
those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Min-
neapolis or the Federal Reserve System.
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